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See Deja Vu I, 274 F.3d at 403 (“Upon remand, the district court should maintain the injunction until Metropolitan Nashville satisfies it that the constitutional problems with the Ordinance's definition of ‘sexually oriented’ and its judicial review procedures have been corrected.”). The government argued that the Ordinance is now constitutional under City of Littleton, Colorado v. On February 23, 2005, the government filed a motion to dissolve the permanent injunction. The amendments narrowed the definition of “sexually oriented,” and the State altered the common law writ to require prompt judicial review in First Amendment cases.
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1952, 152 L.Ed.2d 855 (2002), at which time additional amendments of the Ordinance went into effect. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 535 U.S. In Deja Vu I, this Court affirmed the district court's decision enjoining enforcement of the amended Ordinance, holding that the judicial review provision, i.e., Tennessee's common law writ of certiorari, was constitutionally inadequate and that the statutory definition of “sexually oriented” was overly broad. The government amended the Ordinance and at the same time appealed to this Court. Shortly thereafter, following a hearing on December 21, 1999, the preliminary injunction was converted into a permanent injunction. The district court granted Deja Vu's motion on October 4, 1999, enjoining enforcement of the Ordinance in its entirety. The government responded by notifying the court of ninety-two amendments to the Ordinance since it was enacted. In response, on December 17, 1998, Deja Vu filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction. The government amended the Ordinance and, approximately one year later, the injunction was dissolved. The district court agreed, and on December 8, 1997, entered a preliminary injunction. Deja Vu sought to enjoin the Ordinance by arguing that it was unconstitutional for not providing prompt judicial review. It required “sexually oriented” businesses to obtain licenses and performers to obtain permits. In short, the Metro Nashville government enacted Chapter 6.54 on August 19, 1997. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2001), and Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. It has been described extensively in this Court's previous opinions, Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. The issue on appeal is whether it was proper for the district court to have done so.
#DEJA VU NASHVILLE CODE#
Before us now is Deja Vu's appeal from the district court's decision dissolving a permanent injunction which had enjoined the enforcement of Metropolitan Code of Laws Chapter 6.54 “Sexually Oriented Businesses” (“the Ordinance”), and dismissing the case. This time, it's “like deja vu all over again.” Yogi Berra, available at ht tp://(last accessed June 20, 2006) see also John Fogerty, Deja Vu (All Over Again), on Deja Vu All Over Again (Geffen Records 2004). Last time it was here, the Court remarked that “ ‘deja vu’ provides a particularly appropriate label for this second appeal.” Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2001). This case has been before this Court several times. Charles, Metropolitan Department of Law, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. Pleasants, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellants. Pritzlaff, Shafer & Associates, Lansing, Michigan, Michael F. Young, Metropolitan Department of Law, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. Shafer, Shafer & Associates, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Decided: October 12, 2006īefore MARTIN, MOORE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.ĪRGUED: Bradley J. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee. United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.ĭEJA VU OF NASHVILLE, INC., et al., Plaintifs-Appellants, v.